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The Iraq War:  Efforts During Conflict to  
Address Past Atrocities and Seek Accountability 
 






This case examines a hybrid model for addressing both past atrocities and establishment 
of a culture of human rights protection in a country plagued by decades of human rights 
abuses.  The CPA’s establishment of an office to support these human rights issues was 
unique for a military occupation force during a period of ongoing hostilities.  At the 
highest level, this case explores the issue of whether war-torn nations should seek justice 
for past atrocities, particularly when there are ongoing hostilities and security concerns.   
It raises more specific questions about whether or not human rights protection can be 
enshrined in a government-run entity or whether an outside watchdog group is the 
preferred mechanism.  At the most granular level, the case questions the value of modern-
day DNA identification processes to identify missing persons where the crimes have 
lasted for decades, and there are large numbers of missing persons.  Finally, it addresses 
the challenges associated with administering a domestic war crimes tribunal during 
ongoing hostilities when much of the international war crimes community has decided 




Prior to the launch of the Iraq War, the U.S. government assembled a team of experts to 
focus on human rights and transitional justice issues.  The purpose of this effort was to 
establish a centralized effort to address past human rights atrocities and re-establish a 
culture of human rights protection in Iraq.  The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
created an Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice which was dedicated to this 
effort.  To address past atrocities, this office collected oral testimonies, created 
memorials, assisted Iraqis in the identification of remains lying in mass graves, and 
supported the Iraqi effort to build the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT), the war crimes tribunal 
which held members of the former regime accountable.  To re-establish a culture of 
human rights protection in Iraq, this office supported a newly created Ministry of Human 
Rights, the development of human rights nongovernmental organizations, and other 
human rights related functions, such as human rights treaties, and efforts to monitor 
Iraq’s prison system.  Both the decline of the security situation in Iraq and the broad 
international opposition to the Iraq War brought unique challenges to these institutions.    
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TARGET AUDIENCES 
 
1.  U.S. government agency officials with national security responsibilities 
a. National Security Staff 
b. State Department 
c. U.S. Agency for International Development 
d. Defense Department 
 
2. High-level U.S. military personnel and staffs 
a. Senior military staffs (Joint staff, combatant commands, services) 
b. Senior military leaders 
c. Civil-military planners 
d. Civil Affairs officers 
 
3. U.S. government agency officials with responsibilities for the protection of 
civilian persons in post-conflict environments, and accountability for human 
rights abuses. 
a. State Department’s Office of War Crimes Issues (S/WCI), Office of 
Conflict, Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and International, 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Bureau 
b. U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Transition 
Initiatives (USAID/OTI) and Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) 
c. Justice Department’s Office of Overseas Prosecution, Development, 
Assistance and Training (OPDAT), and International Criminal 
Investigations Development, Assistance and Training (ICITAP) programs  
 
4. Academic experts in human rights protection and transitional justice 
a. J.D. programs with specialization in international humanitarian law 
b. M.A. and Ph.D. programs focused on post-conflict stabilization, human 
rights and transitional justice. 
c. Undergraduate courses in political science. 
 
ISSUES TO CONSIDER 
 
1. What role does accountability play in countries recovering from conflict? 
a. Should peace-building efforts be more significant than justice for past 
crimes? 
b. At what point does justice become revenge?  How can you protect against 
this? 
 
2. Is a hybrid model of looking at past human rights abuses, and building a culture of 
human rights for the future a good thing? 
a. If so, are there other models that will achieve this? 
b. How have UN operations in the past modeled human rights protection and 
accountability for past crimes? 
 
3. Should human rights protection be enshrined in a government institution, such as 
a Ministry, or should it be an independent watchdog? 
a. What are the merits of each? 
b. What role does civil society play in ensuring human rights protection? 
 
4. With respect to the identification of remains, should a high-tech, expensive DNA 
program with exceptional accuracy be the model?  Or alternatively, should we be 
willing to accept more rudimentary, less accurate, home-grown solutions which 
are cheaper and faster? 
a. What are the downsides of each? 
b. Is there a “market” for DNA and other high-end programs which drive 
experts to recommend them in places where they really are not the best 
solution?   
c. What other high-end products does the international war crimes expert 
community “sell”?  Complex databases for evidence collection?   
 
5. Why do you think the international community was so reluctant to support the 
Iraq High Tribunal? 
a. Wasn’t there general consensus that the crimes of Saddam’s regime were 
heinous? 
b. Do you believe that the international community genuinely failed to 
support the tribunal because of the death penalty, and its location in 
Baghdad, or could it be opposition to the Iraq War policy in general? 
c. More broadly, do you believe that international expert assistance should 
be tied to specific conditions (e.g. no death penalty, certain due process 
requirements?)  What are the pros and cons of this? 
  
6. How do you feel about the outcome of Saddam Hussein’s trial? 
a. Would it be a better outcome if he had been convicted but received a 
sentence of life imprisonment?  If that had happened, where do you 
believe he would be today? 
b. Alternatively, had he gone to the Hague, how far along do we believe his 
trial would be? 
c. Should he have been tried for all of his crimes at once, or for one of his 
crimes only (e.g. the Dujail trial or another)? 
  
7. Should the Iraq High Tribunal have continued operations, as it did, when the 
security situation deteriorated?  What are the pros and cons of this? 
 
8. More broadly, where does the balance lie in allowing countries to pursue their 
own justice rather than having the international community do it for them? 
a. Discuss whether or not the ICC (if it has jurisdiction) should take 
jurisdiction in similar cases.  
b. Use this experience to argue for or against a domestic war crimes tribunal 
in Libya.  
 
9. While not the purpose of this specific case, this is a useful backdrop to discuss the 
extent of the damage that the Abu Ghraib scandal caused for U.S. legitimacy in 
Iraq. 
a. How do you think it affected the Iraqi perception of U.S. respect for 
human rights?  Do they believe the U.S. practices what it preaches? 
b. Given that Abu Ghraib was a notorious torture center under Saddam’s 
rule, was it a mistake for the U.S. to operate the prison at all?  Do you 
think the damage would have been quite as severe if the abuse occurred at 





1. Role play - Diplomacy:  Break the students into groups of four.  Have two 
students serve as advisors to the Iraq Governing Council in the summer/fall of 
2003 providing advice on the most essential aspects of their proposed war crimes 
tribunal to the international community, including the consequences they will 
suffer if they do not accept this advice.  Have two students play the Iraq 
Governing Council, laying out why it is essential that Saddam Hussein be tried on 
Iraqi soil, in Arabic, using the death penalty.  This is an exercise in diplomacy and 
effectiveness. 
 
2. Role Play - Empathy:  Break the students into groups of two.  One student will 
play a grieving mother/father at the scene of a mass grave site.  The other student 
will play a member of the CPA in the spring of 2003.  What do you say?  How do 
you approach them?  This is an exercise in empathy, compassion and maintaining 
composure. 
 
3. Mock Trial:  Assign one student of the class to play a disruptive, unruly Saddam 
Hussein who is being televised during the Dujail trial.  Assign another student as 
the Chief Judge of the trial.  The remaining students can be spectators and court 
personnel in the courtroom/audience.  Watch how the Chief Judge handles the 
situation.  This is an exercise which demonstrates the power of perception 
(fairness of the trial, control of the judge, etc.) and the power of grand-standing.  
 
 
 
 
 
